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The prosecution of organised crime: removing the jury 
 
XXXX 
 
 
Abstract  
 
Serious organised crime groups may enjoy virtual impunity through the corruption and 
coercion of parties involved in the criminal justice process. In the UK and Ireland, this is 
most evident in the intimidation of witnesses and jurors, leading to difficulties in 
successful prosecution of organised criminality. One notable response to this 
phenomenon is to hold juryless trials for serious indictable offences, mirroring a similar 
approach in counter-terrorism legislation arising from the political violence in Northern 
Ireland. Despite common rationales, such trials have been operationalised differently in 
these neighbouring jurisdictions: in England, Wales and Northern Ireland “ordinary” 
legislation was introduced, whereas in Ireland juryless trials are permitted under existing 
counter-terrorism laws. This paper reviews the problematic dimensions of both legislative 
schemes, and considers their application by the courts since enactment. After outlining 
viable alternatives, it concludes that juryless trials may be necessary in limited instances, 
and if so, the English model is to be preferred.  
  
 
I. Introduction 
 
Political discourse in the UK and Ireland emphasises the “scourge”1 of organised crime 
that “blights”2 communities. In particular, the dominant perception is that the odds 
remain stacked against the State in terms of the criminal process:
3
 the prosecution of 
suspected organised crime poses challenges in terms of investigating and constructing 
cases, and also of potential danger to individuals involved. In particular, witness 
testimony and lay participation may be difficult to obtain if witnesses and jurors fear 
                                                     
1
 Stage 1 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Bill, Scottish Parliament, November 26, 2009, 
Col 21574 per Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill.  
2
 Home Office, One Step Ahead: A 21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime (Cm 6167) (London, 
Stationery Office, 2004) 9. 
3
 Ibid para 6.3. 
 2 
intimidation or reprisal.
4
 Intimidation, ranging from threats to involved parties, their 
families or property, through to physical violence or even homicide, results in the 
neutralisation of law enforcement, because, of course, without witness testimony and 
impartial juries convictions would be rather more difficult, if not impossible.
5
  
 Such “paralysis of justice” has been called a cardinal feature of organised crime.6 
Nonetheless, despite its political and popular use, there is no “agreed-upon definition” of 
organised crime;
7
 the term may denote specific structures or organisations that are 
involved in criminality; the provision of illegal goods or services; or a certain type of 
crime that meets a given level of gravity.
8
 Maltz proposed a definition requiring not only 
violence, continuity, and variety in the types of criminality engaged in but also 
corruption.
9
 While corruption of the criminal justice process in other jurisdictions may 
involve the targeting of official agents and parties, in the United Kingdom and Ireland the 
primary focus of coercion by organised crime groups is against witnesses and jurors.  
 Though it is difficult to determine the extent of intimidation of lay participants in 
the criminal process, it appears that this phenomenon is not uncommon and has been a 
grave problem in certain parts in the UK for decades.
10
 Moreover, it appears that four to 
five trials per year require 24-hour police protection for jurors,
11
 though, admittedly, 
these figures are not recent. There remains a dearth of empirical material on juror 
coercion and tampering, and when asked in Parliament questions, the Secretary of State 
                                                     
4
 See eg House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Organised Crime in Northern Ireland 
Volume I (Third Report of Session 2005–06) (London, The Stationery Office, 2006) para 85. 
5
 AK Cohen, “The Concept of Criminal Organisation” (1977) 17 British Journal of Criminology 97, 106. 
6
 J Landesco, Organised Crime in Chicago (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968) 23. 
7
 P Van Duyne, “The Phantom and Threat of Organized Crime” (1996) 24 Crime, Law and Social Change 
341, 343. See also F Varese, “What is Organized Crime?” in F Varese (ed), Organized Crime: Critical 
Concepts in Criminology (London, Routledge, 2010) 1–33; FE Hagan, “The Organized Crime Continuum: 
A Further Specification of a New Conceptual Model” (1983) 8 Criminal Justice Review 52; and Frank E 
Hagan, “‘Organized Crime’ and ‘organized crime’: Indeterminate Problems of Definition” (2006) 9 Trends 
in Organized Crime 127. 
8
 See L Paoli and C Fijnaut, “Organised Crime and its Control Policies” (2006) 14 European Journal of 
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 307, 308; N Hamilton-Smith and S Mackenzie, “The Geometry 
of Shadows: A Critical Review of Organised Crime Risk Assessments” (2010) 20 Policing and Society 
257, 261.   
9
 M Maltz, “On Defining ‘Organized Crime’: The Development of a Definition and a Typology” (1976) 22 
Crime and Delinquency 338; also see FE Hagan, Crime Types and Criminals (Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage, 
2010) 300; J Finckenauer, “Problems of Definition: What is Organized Crime?” (2005) 8 Trends in 
Organized Crime 63, 81. 
10
 W Maynard Witness Intimidation: strategies for prevention (London, Home Office, 1994) 4. 
11
 HL Deb 19 November 2003 vol 654 col 1963 per Baroness Scotland of Asthal. 
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for Justice noted that Her Majesty’s Courts Service does not record any data centrally on 
the number of re-trials ordered as a result of jury intimidation.
12
 Similarly, no empirical 
study has been carried out of juror intimidation or coercion in Ireland, but public concern 
has been heightened by incidents like the discovery of a jury list for a murder trial in a 
house-search in Dublin.
13
 Overall, these factors contribute to the receptiveness to the 
prospect of removing the jury in certain instances, both for the protection of the 
individuals involved but also to smooth the operation of the justice process.  
 Despite common rationales, juryless trials are implemented differently in the UK 
and Ireland: in England, Wales and Northern Ireland “ordinary” legislation was 
introduced to abolish the jury in certain instances for indictable offences, whereas in 
Ireland juryless trials are permitted under existing counter-terrorism laws. This paper 
reviews the problematic dimensions of both legislative schemes, and considers their 
application by the courts since enactment. Before analysing the means by which an 
accused may be tried without a jury, the paper next considers the notion of a jury trial and 
its significance.  
  
II. The jury trial 
In general, the right to a jury trial is regarded as a fundamental element of the adversarial 
criminal process, and as a norm that should not be interfered with lightly or unduly. The 
Magna Carta alluded to trial by one’s peers,14 while in Ireland, the jury trial is guaranteed 
under the Constitution.
15
 The significance of this type of trial is manifold. By involving 
lay peers of the defendant in fact-finding, a representative element comprising the 
viewpoint and judgment of the community is imported into the justice process. Moreover, 
the jury trial can comprise an element of participatory democracy,
16
 improving 
community knowledge of the process and enhancing its legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. 
As De Tocqueville noted, juries “spread respect for the courts’ decisions and for the idea 
of rights throughout the classes”.17 Furthermore, the integration of professional and lay 
                                                     
12
 HC Deb, 10 February 2010, c1076W. 
13
 See The Herald, “Murder trial jury names uncovered in Garda raid”, 6 March 2010. 
14
 J Clarke Holt, Magna Carta and the idea of liberty (New York, Wiley 1972). 
15
 Article 38.5.  
16
 V Hans and N Vidmar, Judging the Jury (New York, Plenum Press, 1986) 248. 
17
 A De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York, Doubleday, 1969) 274. 
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decision-making in the criminal trial is viewed as providing a check on the State. This 
safeguard is important both in substance and in a symbolic sense: the jury may mitigate 
or overturn over-reaching State powers or biases, and its presence demonstrates the 
public’s potential to hold the State to account.18 
 Despite the long-standing convention of jury trials for criminal cases in common 
law systems, the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) does not guarantee a right to trial by jury. As the Court of Appeal 
stated in R v Twomey 
It … does not follow from the hallowed principle of trial by jury that trial by judge 
alone, when ordered, would be unfair or improperly prejudicial to the defendant... 
[F]or the purposes of article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, it is irrelevant whether the tribunal is 
judge and jury or judge alone.
19
 
In contrast, the right to a jury trial is protected explicitly under the Irish Constitution for 
all trials on criminal charges, save for three exceptions: trials for minor offences, trials 
before military tribunals,
20
 and trials before a special criminal court.
21
 
 
III. Juryless trials of suspected organised crimes 
Despite these significant dimensions of the jury trial, the possibility of holding juryless 
trials now is well established in England, Wales and Ireland, on the basis of the threats 
both to juror safety and to the administration of justice. Though such instances are most 
likely to arise in relation to organised criminality, the English scheme is not limited in 
this respect: here such a trial is permitted after court order only when specific criteria are 
satisfied. In Ireland, the usual mode of trial may be circumvented in relation to organised 
crime in two ways: existing counter-terrorism legislation permits the holding of a juryless 
trial on the order of the Director of Public Prosecutions (the DPP), and certain organised 
crimes now lead automatically to juryless trials.
22
  
                                                     
18
 P Devlin, Trial by Jury (London, Stevens, 1966) 160 and 164. 
19
 R v Twomey [2009] EWCA Crim 1035; [2010] 1 WLR 630 para 18. 
20
 See Defence Acts 1954 to 2007. 
21
 Article 38.5.  
22
 As is outlined in more detail below, juryless trials were introduced in Ireland first to deal with offences 
against the State.  
 5 
 
a. Juryless trials in the United Kingdom  
Juryless trials first were held in the UK in Northern Ireland in the 1970s to deal with juror 
intimidation by paramilitary organisations and to address perverse acquittals along 
religious or sectarian lines.
23
 Then the Criminal Justice Act 2003 established a separate 
scheme of juryless trials across England, Wales and Northern Ireland in cases of possible 
jury tampering.
24
 The 2003 Act provided, inter alia, a framework for juryless trials on 
indictment in cases of serious or complex fraud
25
 or where there is a danger of jury 
tampering.
26
 This latter provision is not limited to terrorism or political offences. After 
the House of Lords rejected the initial proposals in the Bill, an amendment was inserted 
stating that approval of both Houses was required before the sections on fraud could be 
brought into force.
27
 In fact, the fraud provisions were never enacted and in 2012 were 
removed,
28
 but since 2006 juryless trials may be held under the 2003 Act in the event of 
possible interference with the jury.
29
    
                                                     
23
 In Northern Ireland the Emergency Provisions Act 1973 allowed non-jury trials on indictment of 
scheduled offences in single judge “Diplock courts”. This Act was introduced in an attempt by the UK 
Government to deal with juror intimidation by paramilitary organisations as well as perverse acquittals 
along religious or sectarian lines. See Report of the Commission to consider legal procedures to deal with 
terrorist activities in Northern Ireland, Cmnd. 5185 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1972) and 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973. See S Greer and A White, “A Return To Trial By 
Jury” in A Jennings (ed) Justice under Fire: The Abuse of Civil Liberties in Northern Ireland (London, 
Pluto Press, 1988) 58; S Greer and A White, “Restoring Jury Trial to Terrorist Offences in Northern 
Ireland” in M Findlay and P Duff (eds) The Jury under Attack (London, Butterworths, 1988) 186. Trials on 
indictment may still be held there without a jury where the DPP for Northern Ireland suspects that there is a 
link to a proscribed organisation or political or religious hostility, and that in view of this there is a risk to 
the administration of justice if the trial were conducted with a jury (Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) 
Act 2007 s 1). The legislation was due to expire on 31 July 2011, but was extended for a two-year period 
by the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007 (Extension of Duration of Non-Jury Trial 
Provisions) Order 2011.   
24
 There has been no move towards such trials in Scotland, likely due to the fact that a simple majority 
verdict is permissible in jury trials: in Scotland the jury comprises 15 people, and a majority of eight to 
seven is sufficient. Juries in the rest of the UK and in Ireland comprise 12 people. Section 13 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1967 removed the requirement of unanimity in jury verdicts in England and Wales, so 
a majority of 10 now suffices. The impetus for this included the prevention of acquittal due to the 
intimidation of a juror. Also see the Criminal Procedure (Majority Verdicts) Act (Northern Ireland) 1971 
and the Criminal Justice Act 1984 in Ireland permitting a majority verdict of 10 to two. 
25
 The complexity or length of the trial (or both) must be likely to make the trial so burdensome to a jury 
that the interests of justice require serious consideration to be given to a juryless trial. 
26
 Criminal Justice Act 2003 ss 43 and 44. 
27
 Criminal Justice Act 2003 s 330(5)(b). 
28
 An attempt in the Fraud (Trials without a Jury) Bill 2006-07 to remove the requirement of approval of 
the two Houses was blocked again in the Lords (Hansard HL 20 March 2007, Col 1201, Vol 690). Section 
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 As has been described and analysed previously,
30
 juryless trials may be ordered in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland where there is evidence of a real and present danger 
that jury tampering would take place and that despite any reasonable preventative steps 
there is so substantial a likelihood that tampering would occur as to make it necessary in 
the interests of justice to hold a juryless trial.
31
 In addition, a jury may be discharged 
during a trial and the trial continued without one, if the judge is satisfied that jury 
tampering has taken place and that to continue without a jury would be fair to the 
defendant.
32
 Alternatively, the judge may terminate the trial and may order that any new 
trial must be conducted without a jury.  
 Prior to enactment, it was stated that this development was prompted by the need 
to safeguard jurors from organised criminals,
33
 and more pragmatically, by the cost of 
protecting jurors.
34
 Despite this political rhetoric, judge-only trials are not limited to cases 
of organised crime, notwithstanding that systematic and violent coercion is most likely to 
arise in these instances. Indeed, the Court of Appeal in R v Guthrie rejected the 
submission that the relevant provisions were intended to be confined to very serious 
criminal activity and to cases where the tampering involved serious intimidation by 
professional criminals.
35
 Nonetheless, the Court noted that the level of criminality and 
evidence of organised violent crime is more likely to be relevant where the question is 
whether a trial should start without a jury, than whether an existing trial should continue 
without one.
36
 Thus, it is likely that such applications often will relate to organised crime. 
 
The English model of juryless trials centres on a judicial determination of risk 
where there is strong evidence that the normal system could not operate properly. There 
is no category of suspected cases that falls automatically to be heard without a jury; 
instead the risk of tampering must be established to the satisfaction of the court. This may 
                                                                                                                                                              
113 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 removed the provision on juryless trials in cases of fraud from 
the 2003 Act. 
29
 Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Commencement No 13 and Transitional Provision) Order 2006) and Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 (Commencement No 15) Order 2006. 
30
 See for example P Thornton “Trial by jury: 50 years of change” (2004) Criminal Law Review 683. 
31
 Criminal Justice Act 2003 s 46. 
32
 Criminal Justice Act 2003 s 46. 
33
 HC Deb 19 May 2003 vol 405 c740 per David Blunkett. 
34
 HL Deb 19 November 2003 vol 654 cc1963 per Baroness Scotland of Asthal. 
35
 R v Guthrie [2011] EWCA Crim 1338 para 27. 
36
 ibid. 
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be due to the fact that the provisions are not focused on one type of crime, but on specific 
instances of jury tampering. Thus, the focus is on the established risk of intimidation in a 
particular case, rather than a generic presumption than organised crime cases, say, are 
likely to involve tampering. Indeed, there is no statutory substantive definition of 
“organised crime” or “criminal organisation” in England and Wales, and there is thus no 
body of procedural law that applies to organised crime automatically. Instead, evidence 
must be presented of a real and present danger of jury tampering, and the criminal 
standard of proof is required, given that the “right to trial by jury is so deeply entrenched 
in our constitution”.37 Secondly, it must be established that despite any reasonable 
preventative steps, including police protection, tampering is so likely to occur that the 
interests of justice necessitate a juryless trial. The Court of Appeal has emphasised that 
both conditions must be satisfied.
38
  
 The application of this legislation since 2006 indicates approval of juryless trials in 
very limited instances: just one juryless trial has been held, in R v Twomey, in the Crown 
Court sitting in the Royal Courts of Justice.
39
 While in R v J, S and M there was in fact a 
real and present danger of tampering, the Court concluded that necessary protective 
measures would not impose an unacceptable burden on the jurors.
40
 Similarly, in KS v R a 
“fairly limited level of jury protection” was deemed to sufficient to outweigh the 
potential threat.
41
 This underlines that a juryless trial of a serious criminal offence 
“remains and must remain the decision of last resort”.42 
 The limited use of the provisions may be explained by a number of factors. First, 
the two-pronged test in the 2003 Act sets a high threshold; this derives from the 
reluctance of the House of Lords in its legislative capacity to acquiesce in a break from 
the normal mode of criminal trials. Second, the Court of Appeal requires evidence of a 
real and present danger of tampering to be established to “the highest possible forensic 
standard of proof” before the constitutional right to trial by jury is removed.43 Finally, the 
                                                     
37
 R v Twomey n 19, para 16. 
38
 ibid para 18. 
39
 R v Twomey n 19. 
40
 ibid para 7. 
41
 KS v R [2010] EWCA Crim 1756. 
42
 R v J, S and M [2010] EWCA Crim 1755 para 8. 
43
 R v Twomey n 19 para 16. 
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second aspect of the legislative test has been applied cautiously, and the courts have 
regarded the protection provided by the police as sufficient to safeguard jurors in most 
instances. Thus, the House of Lords and the judiciary in England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland have served as a bulwark against the erosion of jury trials for serious offences, 
notwithstanding the strident tenor of some political discourse preceding legislative 
enactment.  
 Section 46 of the 2003 Act also permits a jury to be discharged during a trial and 
the trial continued without one. The Court of Appeal in R v Twomey noted that “save in 
unusual circumstances, the judge faced with this problem [of tampering] should order not 
only the discharge of the jury but … he should continue the trial”.44 As Taylor 
commented, this is based not on efficiency and convenience but on the notion that no 
advantage should accrue to those involved in jury tampering from terminating a trial 
rather than proceeding to verdict.
45
 A similar sentiment was expressed by the Court of 
Appeal in R v Guthrie, noting that it would be “strange” if a criminal or group of 
criminals could “take extreme steps to undermine the process of trial by jury, and then to 
argue that the judge who had made the necessary findings should not continue the trial.”46 
This is a pragmatic acceptance by the courts of the nature and gravity of jury tampering 
but again this section is used rarely. 
 Such continuation of a trial without a jury occurred in Northern Ireland in R v 
Clarke and McStravick, involving a “soi-disant ‘tiger kidnapping’ scenario” involving an 
employee of a security transportation company and his family.
47
 McCloskey J in the 
Crown Court emphasised that “nothing has occurred … to displace the presumption that, 
as a judge alone, I would constitute an independent and impartial tribunal – and no 
argument to the contrary was advanced”.48 The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal 
against this decision.
49
 Similarly, in R v Guthrie the Court of Appeal heard an appeal 
from the decision of a recorder in the Crown Court to discharge the jury and continue the 
                                                     
44
 R v Twomey n 19 para 20. 
45
 N Taylor, “Case Comment R. v S: judge alone - jury discharged because of jury tampering” (2010) 
Criminal Law Review 643.  
46
 R v Guthrie [2011] EWCA Crim 1338 para 25. 
47
 R v Clarke and McStravick [2010] NICC 7. 
48
 ibid para 38.  
49
 ibid para 47. 
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trial herself.
50
 The recorder found the evidence regarding alleged tampering of a witness 
by a third party to be “clear and cogent”, and concluded that continuing with the trial and 
delivering verdicts would not be unfair to the defendants, though this was not a decision 
taken “lightly or happily”.51 Ultimately she determined that there was “no realistic or 
workable alternative”.52  
 
b. Juryless trials in Ireland  
Like the situation in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, juryless trials may be held in 
Ireland in limited circumstances. The Irish Constitution allows the restriction of the right 
to a jury trial where the Executive declares the ordinary courts to be “inadequate to 
secure the effective administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and 
order”.53 Part V of the Offences Against the State Act 1939 regulates the establishment 
and operation of special judge-only courts in Ireland and comes into force after 
Government proclamation about the inadequacy of the ordinary courts.
54
 Such a 
proclamation has been in force since 1972.
55
 The rationale for removing the jury was and 
remains juror intimidation and the potential compromising of the resultant decision: the 
Irish Government justified the restoration of the juryless Special Criminal Court (SCC) in 
1972 on the basis that juries were likely to be threatened by paramilitaries,
56
 and this 
court continues to be used on the basis that juries in the trial of organised criminals will 
be subject to threats or intimidation.
57
 
 The 1939 Act allows the DPP to direct the hearing of a trial before the SCC on the 
basis that she believes the ordinary courts to be inadequate to secure the administration of 
                                                     
50
 R v Guthrie n 46. 
51
 ibid para 13. 
52
 ibid. 
53
 Article 38.3.  
54
 Offences Against the State Act 1939 s 35. 
55
 Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts, Report of the Committee to Review the 
Offences Against the State Acts 1939-1998 and Related Matters (Dublin, Stationery Office, 2002) para 9.8. 
56
 See the submission of the Irish Government in Eccles, McPhillips and McShane v Ireland (Application 
No 12839/87, 9 December 1988) as referred to in Irish Council for Civil Liberties, ICCL Submission to the 
Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts, 1939-98, and Related Matters (Dublin, ICCL, 
2002). 
57
 C.f. United Nations Human Rights Committee, Report of the Human Rights Committee, Official Records 
of the General Assembly, 48 Session, Supplement No 40, 1993 (A/48/40) Pt 1, 125-128. 
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justice and the preservation of public peace and order.
58
 As well as this risk-based 
approach with the DPP as “gate-keeper”, certain crimes fall within the scope of counter-
terrorism legislation and are heard without a jury automatically. Both avenues will now 
be considered.  
 The certification power of the Irish DPP under existing counter-terrorism 
legislation permits the denial of the constitutional right to a jury trial for non-scheduled 
offences. Two matters of concern arise, one of which is procedural, the other more 
fundamental: firstly, there is no possibility of review as long as the DPP’s decision is 
bona fide,
59
 and secondly, a prosecutor rather than the judiciary holds the ability to limit a 
constitutional right.  
 In fact, the DPP exercises her power in a restrained manner, and does not direct the 
hearing of many cases in the SCC: in 2011 there were 13 juryless trials (including both 
scheduled and non-scheduled offences), compared to 16 in 2010, and ten in 2009.
60
 The 
most common alleged offence was membership of an unlawful organisation, that is, a 
terrorism offence,
61
 but other offences include possession of firearms, ammunition or an 
explosive substance, false imprisonment, and violent disorder
62
 and thus may encompass 
organised criminality. Moreover, it has been asserted that the DPP’s policy is not 
generally in favour of trying organised crimes cases before the SCC;
63
 nevertheless 
reliance on prosecutorial discretion is not ideal in terms of predictability of the 
application of the law and public perception of the legal process.  
 The second means by which organised crime cases are directed to the SCC results 
from the decision of the Irish Parliament to bring certain criminal offences within the 
scope of counter-terrorism legislation. Originally, the Schedule to the Offences Against 
the State Act 1939 encompassed not only acts of terrorism but also firearms offences, 
which are often linked to organised crime.
64
 Now, substantive organised crime offences 
                                                     
58
 ss 47 and 48.  
59
 Savage and Owen v DPP [1982] ILRM 385, 387. 
60
 Courts Service, Courts Service Annual Report 2011 (Courts Service, Dublin 2012) 31. 
61
 Offences Against the State Act 1939, part III. 
62
 Courts Service, n 60, 42. 
63
 F Davis, The History and Development of the Special Criminal Court, 1922–2005 (Four Courts Press 
2007) 151. 
64
 At the time of enactment, the vast majority of firearms-related offences were linked to the political 
struggle.  
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have been added to the Schedule and so the ordinary courts are deemed automatically to 
be inadequate.
65
    
Part 7 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 introduced a number of substantive 
organised crime offences in Ireland: directing the activities of a criminal organisation,
66
 
participating in or contributing to activities of a criminal organisation,
67
 and committing a 
serious offence for a criminal organisation.
68
 There is no equivalent legislation in the 
UK.
69
 These provisions lead to certain procedural and sentencing consequences, 
including being tried without a jury on the basis that the ordinary courts are inadequate to 
secure the effective administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and 
order in relation to organised crime.
70
 This section in the Criminal Justice (Amendment) 
Act 2009 has a sunset clause of 12 months, but has been renewed each year since 
enactment, most recently in June 2013.
71
 The Minister for Justice emphasised that this 
provision and its renewal seek to address “[t]he complete disregard which these gangs 
showed for human lives [which] threatened to subvert the entire justice system”.72 
 Ultimately, such a legislative approach is predicated on the view that organised 
criminality is not “ordinary” crime and so warrants the adoption of measures used against 
suspected terrorists. The level of concern is evident in the assertion of a previous Minister 
for Justice that “the drug and gun culture … poses as significant a threat to the wellbeing 
of the Irish State and Irish society as the paramilitaries did at any stage of their campaign 
                                                     
65
 Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009 s 8. 
66
 Section 3 of the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009 defines a “criminal organisation” as a 
structured group, however organised, that has as its main purpose or activity the commission or facilitation 
of a serious offence, which is that for which a person may be imprisoned for at least four years. A 
structured group comprises at least three persons and cannot be randomly formed for the immediate 
commission of a single offence, and the involvement in the group by two or more of those persons must be 
with a view to their acting in concert. For the avoidance of doubt, the legislation emphasises that such a 
group may exist despite not having formal rules or membership, any hierarchical or leadership structure, or 
continuity of involvement by persons in the group. This seeks to address the ephemeral and flexible nature 
of criminal groups in Ireland, as in the UK, in contrast to groups like the Mafia and the IRA. 
67
 Criminal Justice Act 2006 s 71A (as amended). This has a direct predecessor in the Offences against the 
State (Amendment) Act 1998, which contains the offence of directing an unlawful organisation, such as the 
IRA. 
68
 Criminal Justice Act 2006 s 72 (as amended). 
69
 The Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 criminalises involvement in and direction of 
“serious organised crime” but does not provide for juryless trials. See n 24 above.  
70
 Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009, s 8. 
71
 See Speech on behalf of the Minister for Justice and Equality on Resolution on the continuation in 
operation of Section 8 of the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009 - Seanad Éireann, 19 June 2013. 
72
 Dáil Deb 12 June 2012 vol 768 col 367.  
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for a quarter of a century’,73 and is reiterated in political comments that there is a “serious 
crisis in criminal justice”,74 and that “[g]angland crime constitutes an attack on the State 
in much the same way as the IRA attacked the foundations of the State for many years”.75 
Indeed, the involvement in organised crime groups of individuals who once participated 
in paramilitary violence in Ireland
76
 lends weight to the belief that organised crime merits 
extraordinary reactions beyond the scope of the “ordinary” criminal law. So, in the 
debates about extending juryless trials to organised crimes it was to counter-terrorism 
measures that Irish policy makers looked, rather than to the contemporary scheme in 
place in neighbouring jurisdictions. 
 The automatic holding of juryless trials is a crude reaction to the perceived 
problem of juror intimidation and the fear concerning organised crime in Ireland. As 
previously emphasised, no empirical work exists on the extent of this phenomenon, nor 
on alternatives to wholesale jury abolition. Despite political support for enactment of 
these powers and for their on-going retention, not one case has been brought before the 
SCC under the 2009 Act.
77
 This may be a function of the length of time it takes to 
investigate and construct such cases, and given that a number of people have been 
charged with organised crime offences,
78
 such trials may be heard in future without lay 
fact-finders.  
 
VI Problematic dimensions of juryless trials  
Certain issues arise regarding the holding of judge-only trials, regardless of whether the 
decision is based on suspected risk or automatic inclusion of certain offences, and 
whether prosecutorial or judicial decision is determinative. 
                                                     
73
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 Regardless of one’s views on the value of the jury trial,79 it could be argued that 
the right to equal treatment is threatened when only certain categories of defendant are 
tried by jury. The right to equality is safeguarded by Art 14 of the ECHR, which 
precludes discrimination in the enjoyment of Convention rights. So, rather than 
constituting a “free-standing” right as such, it ensures that other rights are not applied in 
an unequal or discriminatory fashion. Given that there is no right to a jury trial under the 
ECHR, there cannot be any breach of Art 14 in this context.  
 In Ireland, the right to equality is protected by Article 40.1 of the Constitution. 
Though “Article 40 does not require identical treatment of all persons without recognition 
of differences in relevant circumstances”,80 the Irish State may not discriminate between 
citizens in an unjust, arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner.
81
 One could argue 
that that the absence of an articulation of the DPP’s reasons and the blanket removal of a 
jury for suspected organised crimes breaches some defendants’ right to equality, given 
that there may be no intimidation. 
 The matter of equality has been raised before the Irish courts. In Kavanagh v 
Ireland, a case concerning the non-scheduled offence of false imprisonment, the Supreme 
Court held that as the determination of the adequacy of the ordinary courts was political 
in nature, such a decision should not be regulated in the judicial sphere and so did not 
engage with the substantive equality argument.
82
 Subsequently, the claim that equality 
was breached was dismissed in Byrne and Dempsey v Government of Ireland.
83
 Hamilton 
J grounded his decision on the fact that the DPP is authorised directly by statute to issue 
such a certificate and thereby to make a distinction between citizens in this manner.
84
 
While Kavanagh’s later petition to the United Nations Human Rights Committee was 
successful,
85
 the Supreme Court held that the International Covenant on Civil and 
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Political Rights was not part of domestic law;
86
 thus the substance of the decision was 
again bypassed.  
 These judgments indicate considerable judicial deference to the legislature due to 
the perception of an emergency, are resolutely formalistic and fail to engage with the 
crux of the issue which is the reason for treating differently those accused of and tried for 
certain crimes in Ireland.
87
 However, I suggest that these concerns about equality would 
be remedied by the introduction of a means of review of the DPP’s decision,88 and by 
moving away from the blanket abolition of the jury in relation to a select class of 
offences. This would ensure that the measure is neither unjust, arbitrary, nor 
unreasonable.  
 In addition to concerns about equality, it could be argued that the quality of 
decision-making in an adversarial system is jeopardised through judge-only courts. In 
particular, the use of a single judge in England, Wales and Northern Ireland raises 
concerns regarding her role as arbiter of both fact and law. In their study of Diplock trials 
in Northern Ireland, Jackson and Doran determined that the defendants suffered an 
“adversarial deficit” on the basis that lay triers of fact can afford to take a more wide-
ranging view of the merits of the prosecution case than an expert tribunals and that a 
professional approach necessitates a certain case-hardening in the sense that it demands 
that a colder, unemotional attitude is taken towards the evidence.
89
 
 In particular, juryless trials pose problems regarding inadmissible evidence, when 
judges may be required to exclude from their minds incriminating material. Though this 
submission was rejected in DPP v Special Criminal Court,
90
 it is questionable whether a 
judge may cast inadmissible material from her mind, or “‘unbite’ the apple of 
knowledge”.91 As was conceded in People (DPP) v Conroy, “[e]xperience as a judge 
indicates that even as a trained lawyer there is a very significant difficulty in excluding 
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from one’s mind [such] evidence.”92 This issue may be especially pronounced in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland, given that the trials involve single judges, in 
contrast to the three judges that constitute the Irish Special Criminal Court.
93
 Moreover, 
and critically, in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, evidence that might demonstrate a 
real and present danger of tampering is not limited to that which would be admissible at 
the defendant’s trial.94 This permits a broader range of intelligence and information to be 
divulged than would usually be permitted in a criminal trial. 
 Despite the “unrealistic cerebral activity”95 required by the trial court’s position as 
arbiter of fact and law, of course magistrates do this on a regular basis and this is 
generally seen as acceptable. In addition, this concern may be mitigated by the fact the 
court must provide a written judgment of the decisions, outlining the reasoning in relation 
to both aspects of its role,
96
 in contrast to jury trials.
97
 In Director of Public Prosecutions 
v Gilligan the Irish Court of Criminal Appeal noted that if the trial had been heard before 
a jury rather than before the SCC, it, as the appellate court, would not have known how 
the jury reached its verdict or what witnesses it considered to be credible.
98
 Moreover, 
although the Court is not required to disqualify itself from a case where it has heard 
inadmissible evidence that is prejudicial to the accused it has the discretion to do so, and 
this would not be impracticable, given that the panel of judges for the SCC is sufficiently 
large to allow a reconstituted court to hear the case.
99
 So, the provision of a written 
judgment and the possibility of a judge recusing herself remedies concerns about the 
quality of decision making in this context.  
 
V. Alternatives to juryless trials  
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So, juryless trials raise issues in terms of equality and the quality of decision-making, 
though as noted these are not insurmountable. Due to these concerns and the absence of 
lay participation, one may conclude that juryless trials are never justified in the common 
law context, especially given the existence of alternative protective measures. These are 
now considered.  
One feasible alternative to abolishing the jury is to limit the existing right to 
inspect the panel from which jurors are drawn.
100
 The right to inspect is predicated on 
transparency, but affords considerable potential for intimidation; the names of jurors 
chosen could be matched with the initial panel list to find their addresses.
101
 Indeed, in 
Northern Ireland the right to inspect has been abolished, and restrictions have been placed 
on the disclosure of juror information by court, electoral and police officers as well as by 
jurors themselves.
102
 Surprisingly, given its potential as a safeguard, this development 
has not been mirrored in the rest of the UK or in Ireland.  
 Another approach would be to hold the trial without the jury present in court but 
rather viewing the proceedings by closed-circuit television.
103
 Similar schemes for 
witnesses have been approved by domestic and European courts,
104
 and so this would not 
affect the fair trial of the defendant. Nevertheless, it is possible that the members of the 
jury would be influenced by the protective measures deemed to be necessary in such 
cases, and even with a judicial warning could construe this as implying guilt or at least 
dangerousness on the part of the accused. Thus, caution should be exercised regarding the 
adoption of such a measure.  
 Crucially, neither of these suggestions overcomes the very real prospect of the 
jurors being followed home, and so may not be sufficient. To remedy this, juries could be 
transported to the court from a distance so that they are less likely to be followed. As 
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Davis argues, however, there are economies of scale regarding the maintenance of 
anonymity in this way:
105
 the possibility of transporting juries to the court from a distance 
may not prove practicable in Ireland, given the size of the country. 
 On the other hand, the members of the jury could be anonymised, such as has 
occurred in the United States in the trial of suspected organised criminals.
106
 In United 
States v Gotti, for example, the jurors were referred to by number only, were housed in a 
secret location, and their calls, mail and visits were monitored.
107
 This approach certainly 
would protect the vulnerable parties, but would also entail significant police resources 
and time, one of the precise reasons that the 2003 Act was introduced by the legislature in 
London. In addition, this attempt to retain a lay dimension for serious criminal trials 
holds the risk of prejudice in terms of what it expresses to the jury.  
  Goldstock further proposes the creation of a structure that permits citizen 
participation while minimising the likelihood of juror intimidation, through the use of a 
couple of “jurors” who would advise the judge as to questions of fact but whose advice 
would not bind the judge.
108
 While initially this may seem appealing, it pays mere lip-
service to the notion of lay involvement in the criminal trial and simultaneously may 
overlook the possibility of coercion. 
 This appraisal of alternatives indicates that inspection of the jury list should be 
abolished, but this itself is limited protection for the jury that ultimately is chosen. Only 
anonymisation holds the potential to safeguard the jury adequately but is problematic in 
terms of prejudice. Given the cost and logistical difficulties, in some extreme cases the 
potential threat may be such that a juryless trial is unavoidable, as otherwise jurors’ 
safety could not be guaranteed and the proper administration of justice could not be 
ensured. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
                                                     
105
 Davis n 63, 151. 
106
 See for example United States v Barnes 604 F 2d 121 (2nd Cir 1979), cert den 446 US 907 (1980) and 
United States v Nicodemo Scarfo aka “The Little Guy” 850 F2d 1015 (1988). 
107
 United States v Gotti 777 F.Supp.224 (1991). 
108
 R Goldstock, Organised Crime in Northern Ireland: A Report For The Secretary Of State (Belfast, 
Northern Ireland Office, 2004) para 5.15.  
 18 
As this paper has detailed, the legislative provisions permitting juryless trials so far have 
been applied in a very cautious manner in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Though 
prior to enactment policy makers cited the threat of organised criminality, the legislative 
scheme in fact is concerned with the proven specifics of individual cases rather than a 
generic concern about tampering in relation to certain types of offences. In contrast, the 
Irish legislature views the intimidation of jurors as an ineluctable concern in prosecuting 
organised crime. There, the removal of the jury has been permitted through the “seepage” 
into a broader context of “extraordinary” measures introduced to deal with subversive 
crime.
109
 Without the scheme provided for in the Offences Against the State Act 1939, it 
is questionable whether legislation would have been enacted in Ireland to dispense with 
jury trials for those suspected of organised criminality.
110
 Yet, as the Special Criminal 
Court is seen as an established and benign feature of the Irish criminal justice system, 
there is little political or popular pressure to dispense with it,
111
 or, as is relevant here, to 
limit its continued expansion. 
 Rather than contributing to state security or the protection of the rule of law, the 
limitation of the jury trial in these islands essentially is to ensure the safety of certain 
individual parties and so should not be subsumed within a counter-terrorism paradigm. 
Fortunately the threats posed by organised crime in Ireland and the UK to citizens on the 
jury and to the administration of justice are not widespread or endemic. This underlines 
the need for a case-by-case approach, grounded on objectively justifiable and articulated 
reasons, rather than a class-based presumptive model. This provides a reasonable 
compromise between the need to protect the jury and the fair trial of the accused, while 
maintaining the norm of the jury trial in most instances.  
 It could be argued that permitting an unorthodox mode of trial to be implemented 
in the usual criminal courts may in fact lead more readily to its normalisation. As 
Weisselberg observed in the context of terrorism prosecutions in the United States, 
employing the ordinary process and court system in this respect may affect the 
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development of domestic law adversely or distort existing law.
112
 This fear has not been 
realised, given that the construction of the legislation and its application by the courts has 
maintained the norm of jury involvement for the trial of serious offences. In light of the 
potential restriction of the constitutional right to a jury trial, the decision regarding the 
form of trial should lie with the courts on a case-by-case basis, as occurs in England, 
rather than with the prosecution or legislature. It may be argued that this risks 
inconsistency and the possibility of more legal challenges. Though this may be true, 
dispensing with the jury automatically for certain offences is an unprincipled reaction to 
an issue that may not be a threat in every case of suspected organised crime. 
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